US...O...nevermind

It was billed as a star-studded USO entertainment tour for armed forces on the ground. For the first part of our tour we were stationed at the periphery of the war; a nasty little base known best for being the Southern point of the "Sunni Triangle", a.k.a. "Triangle of Death". No USO shows made it out to those nether-regions. After we moved to Baghdad, we were essentially too tired from a high mission tempo, or too busy to pay much attention to any of the shows that passed through. With this in mind, and with our schedule open, Bob and I decided that we would at last take advantage of the opportunity to put a good, ol' fashioned USO show under our belts at the end of our tour of duty. The show was to feature Robin Williams, Kid Rock, Lance Armstrong, and several others. We headed over to the Division field house where the meet-and-greet was to take place. We arrived a full hour and forty-five minutes early to ensure ourselves a seat, and there was already a substantial line. While we waited, the temperature dropped, and the line rapidly lengthened. We estimated that by the time they opened the doors, there were approximately 3,000 persons in line for a venue that was going to be limited to 600 persons.

Rumors started to move through the crowd even before we entered the building. Once inside, they were confirmed. High winds in Tikrit had grounded the helicopters, and the show was canceled. Instead, we were greeted to a ten minute "pep talk" by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mullen, who reassured us that he received briefings on what was going on in Iraq. Really. He then proceeded to distribute commemorative coins, shake hands, and have his photo snapped with anybody who wished it. Bob and I received coins, but we were rushed through so rapidly, that we were unable to get photos with the Admiral.

While we were waiting in line, I scanned the crowd and it occurred to me that these USO concerts probably are not attended by the soldiers for whom they are largely intended. The soldiers doing the heavy-lifting in this war are the guys stationed away from the big bases. They're quartered out in the neighborhoods in converted office building, houses, or police stations. They make it back to base maybe one day out of the week. Instead, those attending these "moral-boosting" functions appeared to be largely the "fobbits"; those with desk jobs, Air Force personnel, and others who otherwise almost never make it outside the wire. A significant percentage of the crowd was also civilians; handsomely compensated KBR employees and contractors. We stood in line next to a group of these guys who loudly compared the quality of many of the USO shows and celebrities they'd had occasion to see over the past year.

It is now Christmas day. The dining facilities on base are packed with soldiers taking advantage of an extravagant Christmas dinner with all the trimmings. Rather than deal with the huge lines, our detachment opted to ante up, and one of our interpreters arranged to bring in a positively massive authentic Iraqi feast from one of Baghdad's finer restaurants. The quantity and variety of delectables was mind-boggling. All manner of meats and vegetables, rice, soups, sauces, and breads, were followed by a selection of sweet desserts. It was enough, even for a short while, to relieve the ache of being so far from home and loved ones.

Merry Christmas from Baghdad.

Something wicked this way comes

Some new mechanical monsters are crawling through Baghdad's streets these days. They are MRAP (Mine Resistant Ambush Protected) vehicles. The medium sized US Army version began arriving a month or so ago, and units have gradually been getting trained up on them. Troop reaction has been mixed. My first reaction upon seeing them lined up outside our battalion headquarters was that these things are really going to irritate the Iraqis! The base vehicle is really tall. But when you add a turret, and all of the antennae required by the schmorgasboard of communications and anti-IED electronics, well... the gunner damn near performs the function of close air support! Here are some of the problems as I see it. First, most of Baghdad operates on power generated by local private, or neighborhood, generators rather than the cities power grid. This means that a large generator parked on a street corner will have hundreds of wires strung from it like a spider web feeding homes and businesses in the area. As the ability of the city to provide power ebbed, this chaotic overhead wiring began to blanket the city like a great, multi-colored cobweb. We routinely snag one or two of these low-hanging wires with our vehicle antennas when we drive through neighborhoods. They snap, and eventually somebody will have to come out and restring the wire. (We've also had guys electrocuted by these wires, and had equipment snagged that became dislodged from the vehicle and injured soldiers.) In most neighborhoods, the residents eventually began to accommodate the humvees by elevating the wiring beyond the reach of the antenna. However, now with the introduction of the MRAP, a huge percentage of the wire that feeds electricity to Baghdad's homes and business is now at risk once again. We recently did a patrol composed of one humvee (that would be us) and three MRAP's. We watched in awe as the vehicle in front of us took down strand after strand after strand of the wires strung over the streets. People on the sidewalks had to be particularly alert as cables snapped towards them like angry bullwhips. Not the most effective way to win hearts and minds!

Second, there is the psychological impact of having these monstrosities rolling through neighborhoods. There is no question that these are significantly more resistant to IED attack. However, one of the most effective components of the current counter-insurgency strategy is the integration with the communities we're tasked with protecting. This means, getting to know the people, developing relationships, and learning the proverbial pulse of the neighborhood. Rolling around in armored humvees makes achieving this level of intimacy difficult enough. (I personally would prefer greater emphasis on dismounted foot patrols.) But, moving from humvees to MRAP's, from a psychological point of view, only serves to distance us further from the population, and it comes at a time when the number if IED attacks against us appears to be nearing an all-time low.

Lastly, another drawback relating to the height of these beasts is the propensity of the crew to misjudge the distance to the ground when they dismount the vehicle. Burdened by armor, weapons and gear, we've seen numerous broken ankles and other injuries simply from getting in and out of the vehicles.

That said, not all units are using the MRAP's they've been issued. Some commanders are opting to just keep them on the property books and turn them over to the unit that replaces them when the time comes. It is also probably true that the vehicles are also being employed elsewhere, perhaps in more kinetically active areas or main supply routes, where the terrain and conditions give the characteristics of the MRAP a decided advantage over humvees. In my opinion, however, that just isn't the case in our area.

If it ain't rainin', we ain't trainin'

Yesterday the long awaited (and dreaded) rains came to Baghdad. An impressive lightning and thunderstorm pushed waves of rain and hail across the city turning the omnipresent powdered sugar-like dust into a sloppy, sticky, muddy mess. It remains to be seen if this storm is an aberration, of if it can be considered the official beginning of the rainy season. American and Iraqi officials throughout Baghdad have been pouring extra resources into neighborhoods to reduce the amount of trash on the streets. The fear is that the rains will wash the trash into the already dilapidated sewer systems and further aggravate an already critical problem of broken pipes and lakes of raw sewage.

Meanwhile, grassroots efforts are taking place to institutionalize the security gains of recent months, while at the same time work towards sectarian reconciliation in the absence of legislative action at the national level. Neighborhood volunteers, dubbed Critical Infrastructure Guards (GIG's), have been recruited in Sunni neighborhoods to receive rudimentary training, and work alongside the predominantly Shia Iraqi Army and Iraqi Police. They've begun jointly manning checkpoints, and participating in joint patrols of the neighborhoods. The Iraqi soldiers are supposed to assume the role of mentors to these new recruits, and provide them with additional on-the-job training. In return, the new volunteers bring to the table local knowledge of the neighborhoods from whence the come, as well as vastly improved relationships between the security forces and the residents of the communities, who are the friends and family of the new volunteers. As the CIG's gain experience, a certain percentage will be selected to attend the Iraqi Police Academy where they will undergo additional training, and shed their quasi-official status. Under the umbrella of increasingly detached American oversight, the hope is that the program will result in a much improved and professional Iraqi security apparatus.

Friction, however, is inevitable. Aside from the sectarian nature of the arrangement, there is the implicit threat to the status of the Iraqi soldiers who no doubt resent the presence of the volunteers. There is also the very real danger of al Qaeda infiltration of the ranks of new recruits. I had occasion to speak with one of the volunteers who was a Sunni, and a Major in the old army under Saddam. He acknowledged that it will take time to work through many of the problems, but he remained optimistic. He expressed great enthusiasm to be able to serve again in a productive capacity. He clasped my hand, looked me in the eye, and told me with some emotion that none of this would have been possible without the help of the Americans. I just smiled, and said, "Welcome back, sir." He squeezed my hand tighter, and beamed.

The professionalism of the Iraqi Army remains...uneven, and largely a direct reflection of the quality of their leadership. We routinely conduct inspections of Iraqi-manned checkpoints. In the course of one such inspection, an American soldier noticed a ballistic (bulletproof) vest sitting on a chair. When he picked it up, he noticed that it was much lighter than it should have been. To reduce the weight, the Iraqi soldier who owned the vest had replaced the interior ballistic armor plate with ...a book. Now, here is the kicker, and I am not making this up: The book was a medical text on heart trauma.